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Background: It is recognized that decisions taken in the early recovery period may affect the development of
health systems. Additionally, some suggest that the immediate post-conflict period may allow for the opening of a
political ‘window of opportunity’ for reform. For these reasons, it is useful to reflect on the policy space that exists
in this period, by what it is shaped, how decisions are made, and what are their long-term implications. Examining
the policy trajectory and its determinants can be helpful to explore the specific features of the post-conflict
policy-making environment. With this aim, the study looks at the development of policies on human resources for
health (HRH) in Sierra Leone over the decade after the conflict (2002–2012).
Methods: Multiple sources were used to collect qualitative data on the period between 2002 and 2012: a stakeholder
mapping workshop, a document review and a series of key informant interviews. The analysis draws from political
economy and policy analysis tools, focusing on the drivers of reform, the processes, the contextual features, and the
actors and agendas.
Findings: Our findings identify three stages of policy-making. At first characterized by political uncertainty, incremental
policies and stop-gap measures, the context substantially changed in 2009. The launch of the Free Health Care Initiative
provided to be an instrumental event and catalyst for health system, and HRH, reform. However, after the launch of the
initiative, the pace of HRH decision-making again slowed down.
Conclusions: Our study identifies the key drivers of HRH policy trajectory in Sierra Leone: (i) the political situation, at
first uncertain and later on more defined; (ii) the availability of funding and the stances of agencies providing such
funds; (iii) the sense of need for radical change – which is perhaps the only element related to the post-conflict setting.
It also emerges that a ‘windows of opportunity’ for reform did not open in the immediate post-conflict, but rather
8 years later when the Free Health Care Initiative was announced, thus making it difficult to link it directly to the
features of the post-conflict policy-making environment.
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In the immediate aftermath of a conflict, governments
and international donors alike recognize the necessity to
rapidly rebuild the health system and increase health
service provision for the population, as a goal in itself as
well as an entry point for peace building [1]. At this
time, one of the most problematic aspects lies in striking* Correspondence: maria.bertone@lshtm.ac.uk
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[2-4]. This balance is even more delicate as decisions
taken in the early recovery period are thought to affect the
long-term development of the health system, including its
efficiency and equity [5]. For this reason, it is particularly
useful to reflect on the policy space that exists in the post-
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of those decisions. A longitudinal approach to examining
policy-making going beyond the immediate recovery years
is particularly needed and has been highlighted as a gap in
the literature on health systems in post-conflict and fragile
settings [6].
This study aims to address this gap by focusing on the
development of policies and reforms around the issue of
human resources for health (HRH) in Sierra Leone over
the decade that followed the end of the civil war, from
2002 until 2012. It is widely recognized that HRH repre-
sent a key component of health systems, albeit an often
overlooked one, especially during the rebuilding of the
health system and the re-establishing of the health ser-
vices after conflict [7]. Moreover, public health workers
(HWs) are an essential link between the government
and the population in all areas of the country, including
the most remote ones, which could help develop the
legitimacy of the government and demonstrate the gov-
ernment’s commitment to service provision and equity
[8]. However, beyond the importance of health work-
force reconstruction in the post-conflict period and the
need to establish an effective incentive environment to
recruit, retain and motivate HWs, focusing on HRH
policy development may also provide a useful case study
to (i) explore the pattern of reform and features of the
post-conflict policy environment and (ii) verify the hypoth-
eses suggested in relation to post-conflict policy settings.
In particular, we explore whether policies developed
according to ‘path-dependency’ [9] because of historical
decisions made (or not made) in previous stages and linked
(or not) to the post-conflict setting. Or rather, whether
there was a political ‘window of opportunity’ for reform in
the post-conflict period, as suggested by some [5,7,10].
In line with this aim, the focus on the study is rather
on the policy choices, the ‘drivers’ and reasons of these
choices, than on the evaluation of the policy outcomesa.
We look at the trajectory taken by the HRH policy, in-
cluding the official strategic documents and the practical
shifts and measures introduced to address the HRH
challenges over the first post-conflict decade. Our ob-
jective is to narrate the ‘policy story’ and investigate how
decisions were made, which factors and actors influ-
enced them and what defined their timing. We believe
that looking at the path taken by the HRH policy trajec-
tory can illuminate the policy-making patterns in the
post-conflict period and the legacies of such decisions in
the longer term.
This paper is structured as follows. The next section
briefly sets the context of the health status of the popu-
lation and the health system in Sierra Leone before the
conflict. Then, we present the methods and some limitations
of our study. The findings section begins with the health
system and HRH context in the immediate aftermath ofthe war and then narrates the policy story, depicting how
HRH policy developed from 2002 until 2012. In the dis-
cussion section, the post-conflict policy-making trajectory
and its features are identified and analyzed, before
concluding with a review of the research questions.
Context
Sierra Leone emerged in 2002 from a 10-year period of
war and social and economic unrest. During that time,
about 50,000 people were killed and 2 million displaced,
which amounted to almost half of the population. It is
estimated that more than 20,000 children were conscripted
as soldiers [11].
Studies carried out before the conflict provide some
information on the health status of the population and on
the health system. Data from the 1974 census show that
life expectancy at birth was 36–40 years for females and
33–37 years for males and the infant mortality rate was
225 per 1000 [12,13]. In 1980, 31 of the 146 chiefdoms
(the lower level in the administrative system in Sierra
Leone) had no government health facilities, whether a
hospital or a dispensary, and only 5-10% of children below
the age of 5 were enrolled at a clinic [12]. According to
some studies, the underutilization of health care services,
particularly in rural areas, was related to the low availabil-
ity of healthcare facilities, poor quality of services in the
available public facilities [14], frequent drug stock-outs
and irregular payment of health workers salaries [15]. As a
consequence, most people chose to buy drugs from the
market, visit private or mission clinics or make unofficial
payments to healthcare workers in public health facilities.
Against this background, user fees were introduced in the
1980s, through the Cost Recovery Policy of the Ministry
of Health and Sanitation Sierra Leone emanating from the
Bamako Initiative. Public health expenditure declined by
60% between 1980 and 1987, such that by 1995 91% of the
health expenditure were private, of which 95% were out-
of-pocket expenditures, providing no financial protection
against illness [15].
The conflict lasted between 1991 and 2002 and, al-
though it alternated between periods of higher and lower
intensity and affected the areas of the country in different
ways, it paralyzed the economy and the provision of public
services and caused the destruction of the infrastructures
and governmental institutions throughout the country.
The public health system in the aftermath of the conflict
was practically collapsed. Only 16% of the health centers
were still functioning by 1996, mainly in Freetown [16].
Recent data paint a dire picture of the health situation in
the country. Maternal mortality remains extremely high at
857 deaths per 100,000 live births for the period between
2003–2008 [17], while in 2010 under-five mortality was
estimated at 217 per 1,000 live births and infant mortality
at 128 [18].
Bertone et al. Conflict and Health 2014, 8:11 Page 3 of 12
http://www.conflictandhealth.com/content/8/1/11Methods
This study is part of a research project carried out by
the ReBUILD Project Consortium in Sierra Leone which
specifically focused on health workers incentives. The
overall objectives of the project are, to document how
the incentive environment has evolved after the conflict
and understand what influenced the trajectory; to describe
the reform objectives, mechanisms, intended and unin-
tended consequences; and to document lessons learned
(on design, implementation, sustainability and suitability
to context), reflecting on how they can be used to guide
future interventions. The study received ethics approval
from the Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine and from
the Sierra Leone Ethics and Scientific Review Committee.
The overall study design of the research project
utilizes both quantitative and qualitative methods and is
based on retrospective collection of data and informa-
tion on the 10-year period between the end of the con-
flict in 2002 and the time of the research, which started
in 2012. Six different tools were applied to gather data.
A half-day stakeholder mapping (SM) workshop was
held in October 2012 in Freetown with 23 stakeholders
in the health sector in order to understand the key
actors who have influenced policy and practices in HRH
in Sierra Leone over the post-conflict period [19]. Subse-
quently, a document review was carried out, based on
documents retrieved through contacts in country, as well
as in journals and grey literature. A total of 76 documents
were identified, of which 57 were deemed relevant for
HRH issues [20]. Finally, 23 key informant interviews (KII)
were conducted, in and outside Sierra Leone, between
October 2012 and June 2013. Twelve of the interviewees
work(ed) with the Ministry of Health and Sanitation
(MoHS), 6 were NGO representatives, 4 donor representa-
tives and 1 a technical assistant to the MoHSb [21]. The
other three data collection methods were: routine HRH
data analysis, in-depth interviews with health workers and
a survey of health workers. These are not described in
detail in this article as this study draws from the first three
research components onlyc.
The methodology adopted reflects the difficulty of col-
lecting original data over such a long period of time and
in a post-conflict setting, where information is scarce and
difficult to retrieve [22]. The combination of methods was
conceived so that each could build upon the others, allow-
ing for the collection of information to be enriched in an
iterative way. For instance, the document review was help-
ful in order to formulate preliminary hypotheses and guide
the key informant interviews, and the interviews were
critical to illuminate on the gaps that had emerged in the
documentary review, in particular regarding the discus-
sions, processes and dynamics between actors, for which
the documents were silent. Due to the combination of data
collection methods, it was possible to compare andthoroughly triangulate findings. Similarities and discrepan-
cies were analyzed in a reflective way to better understand
why perceptions and insights differ between actors and
sources. This process ensured that the methodologies are
complementary and helpful in shedding light on the pro-
cesses of policy-making in a comprehensive way and from
different perspectives.
Despite the careful triangulation of information, our
methodology and sampling present the following limita-
tions: (i) the majority of the participants during the key
informant interviews and in the group discussion for the
stakeholder mapping, as well as the bulk of the documents
retrieved (about half), are from the MoHS or from other
governmental bodies; (ii) few documents referred to the
HRH situation prior to 2009, whilst more than 50% of
the documents were dated after 2011; and (iii) only few
respondents were present in Sierra Leone and engaged in
HRH policy-making for the period under review, and par-
ticularly during the immediate post conflict period. Those
who were present for the entire time found it difficult to
recall events that occurred in the immediate post conflict
period and emotional and personal narratives emerge
rather than organizational ones.
Although the findings section is based on the chrono-
logical narration of the HRH policy evolution and does
not follow in its structure the conceptual elements of an
analytical framework, the analysis is inspired by political
economy and policy analysis approaches [23,24]. Draw-
ing from these approaches, rather than looking exclu-
sively at the policy content and implementation, our
analysis focuses on the interactions between the context,
including the historical legacies, the evolving formal and
informal institutions and power structures; the actors,
both national and external, applying ideological, political
and financial pressures to decision-making; and the dy-
namic processes of the political system [25-28]. We use
these analytical tools in a flexible manner as our analysis
is not performed cross-sectionally looking at a specific
moment in time, but rather covers a 10-year period. We
explore, for each reform or policy stage in turn, the polit-
ical processes and dynamics of change, looking at the key
drivers of reform, the main actors, their roles, agendas
and influences, and the formal and informal arenas in
which they interacted.
Findings: the unfolding ‘policy story’
Immediate post-conflict context and HRH challenges
By the end of the conflict in 2002, the situation of
the health system was extremely challenging. Concerning
HRH, little data and documentation exist and those
available are often unreliable and contradictory [29]. As
one respondent noted, this reflects the fact that all actors
were primarily concerned with the pressing needs of
the early recovery and little time was available for the
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for academic research.
The available information shows that the challenges
faced at the time in Sierra Leone are not dissimilar to
those in other post-conflict contexts [7,10,29]. The basic
health infrastructure was destroyed and most services
were completely disrupted, especially in the eastern and
southern part of the country where most of the rebel ac-
tivity took place. Health facilities were grossly understaffed
as many HWs had left the country, and particularly those
in the higher cadres. Other HWs were employed by NGOs
or held dual positions with NGOs and the MoHS [30].
The majority of those HWs who stayed in the government
service preferred to work in Freetown or in the Western
Area around the capital. The data available for that period
clearly indicate a significant loss of qualified HWs in the
public health sector in Sierra Leone which created a gap
that remained to be filled in the aftermath of the conflict.
Of the 203 Medical Officers that were present in the
country in 1993, only 67 remained in 2005 and of the 623
State Registered Nurses (SRN) 152 remained [31]. While
the private sector employed only a small minority of the
health workforce, centered in the capital, in the few years
immediately after the conflict, many HWs in the public
sector were working with NGOs in the governmental fa-
cilities, for which they would receive incentives and train-
ing, whether under a formal agreement with the MoHS or
without. NGOs supporting public facilities also recruited
and funded personnel, which was later absorbed in the
MoHS payroll.
In those early years, the extreme lack of coordin-
ation between the different actors in the health sys-
tem appears to be an important feature of the policy
context. The term ‘chaos’ frequently emerged in the
respondents’ narratives:
“What happened was, during a period of chaos, most of
the NGOs were operating on their own” (KII - MoHS).
“After the war, it was complete chaos. The NGOs
came and went […]. They employed the nurses
directly, without even consulting the Ministry. […]
They never presented any budget. But this was a
war. We had to bend backwards in the Ministry”
(SM – MoHS).
This highlights the fragmentation of the health system
at this stage and the struggle that the government
through the MoHS faced to create a system and estab-
lish control over the health workforce. However, it seems
that the MoHS was able to maintain a certain leadership
to start the process of reconstructing the public health
system. For example, in contrast to other countries in
similar post-conflict situations [6,32-34], in Sierra Leonehealth services were provided by public facilities and
were not contracted-out to other actors of the health sys-
tem. Although the choice of not adopting a contracting-
out approach did not appear to be made explicitly by any
of the actors but was rather the consequence of the
specific context, it clearly had lasting consequences which
affected the future development of the healthcare system.
The development of formal HRH policies: 2002–2009
Against this backdrop, HRH reforms began to develop.
Our findings reveal that between 2002 and 2009 the pro-
gress towards policy-making for a coherent restructuring
of the health workforce was not rapid or effective. Al-
though the challenges were correctly identified by the
MoHS and potential solutions being proposed (cf. for
example [30,35]), very little was happening in practice.
Relatively minor changes were introduced to improve
the management of HWs in order to keep the system
functioning. For instance, between 2006 and 2007, the
Scheme of Service was reviewed to ensure a clearer car-
eer path and HWs started receiving allowances for hous-
ing, remote area placements, and leave [35,36]. However,
the major reforms suggested in the annual presentations
of the MoHS HRH Manager and in other informal MoHS
documents [30,35], remained unfunded and unimple-
mented and the response to the HRH challenges was
fragmented. At the same time, a series of broad pol-
icies and strategies were being drafted – in 2002 the
National Health Policy (NHP) [37], followed by the
Human Resources for Health Development Plan 2004–
2008 [38] and then the Human Resources for Health
Policy in Sierra Leone [39]. Similar to other post-conflict
contexts, these documents tended to remain relatively
vague normative frameworks rather than operational doc-
uments to be reflected in changes at peripheral level
[7,22,40]. As the most recent HRH Policy (2012) states,
“there have been two attempts to formulate national pol-
icy to guide the development and management of Human
Resource for Health in Sierra Leone […], but none was
finalized or adopted for implementation” ([41]: p.6).
The lack of technical and implementation capacity within
the MoHS could explain why policies remained on paper.
Additionally, external agencies played a significant role
in this, in particular because their mandate narrowly
focused on production rather than implementation of
the strategies. Some key informants pointed out to the
fact that these policies were externally-driven, lacking
the national ownership that would ensure their effective
implementation:
“People started working on their own areas and they
started developing a policy and plan and things like
that […]. But it was all happening in parallel, also
depending […] on the focus of donors to provide TA
Bertone et al. Conflict and Health 2014, 8:11 Page 5 of 12
http://www.conflictandhealth.com/content/8/1/11and funding for certain things. So I think a lot of
policies applied at the beginning were definitely
donor-driven. WHO said ‘you don’t have a policy on
this and this. We have to develop it’, and you’ll get it.”
(KII - NGO).
The piecemeal support of the international community
did not allow for the strengthening of the MoHS, espe-
cially as donors focused on ‘their’ programmes, support-
ing one or another department or units, undermining
the overall capacity of the MoHS and creating a frag-
mentation within the Ministry, with long-lasting conse-
quences [4].
Among the reasons for the delay in the adoption and
implementation of major shifts in HRH policy may be
the lack of clear political vision on the future of the
health system more broadly. Indeed, key informants
agree that in the years following the conflict, strategic
policies and plans were slow to be put in place or miss-
ing altogether.
“The main issue during this time [was that] the
Human Resources Strategic Plan was not adequately
addressing the issues of Human Resources. Because of
the absence of a strategic plan, we were just
swimming with ideas […] and there was no clear
direction as to what to do.” (KII – donor).
“Let me tell you something, in life when you do
not have a goal you are working towards and you
go purposeless, aimless, you’re slow at it.”
(KII – MoHS).
The consequence of the lack of political guidance and
strategic vision was a general sense of ‘purposelessness’.
This resonates with the findings of the documentary
review, where it emerged how fluid and uncertain policy
context was, as explicitly recognized by the HRH Develop-
ment Plan 2004–2008 which states that a certain flexi-
bility will be allowed in the proposed activities “given
the current level of uncertainty regarding the exact na-
ture of the reforms” ([38]: p.80 – italics added). Obviously,
the broader political dimension is important to under-
stand the lack of strategic vision for the health sector. The
government elected in 2002, which seemed to initially
enjoy some support, soon lost much of its popularity given
its weaknesses in terms of leadership to drive for reform,
especially compared to the following administration in
power from 2007 ([4] & KII). For the HRH sector, the
consequence of drafting broad policies without an over-
all vision on the ways to rebuild and strengthen the health
system was a relatively static approach, which left little
space for innovation and focused mostly on “fire-fighting”,
as suggested by a respondent, i.e. tackling the mostimmediate issues with quick-fix solutions. The situation
substantially changed with the introduction of the ‘free
health care initiative’ (FHCI).
The introduction of the FHCI: 2009–2010
In September 2009, the President of Sierra Leone, Ernest
Bai Koroma, announced at a donors’ conference in London
his intention to launch a reform to introduce free health-
care for pregnant women, lactating mothers and children
under 5 years of age [42]. Soon after, the announcement
was made in Sierra Leone to the MoHS and partners and
an official launching document was drafted [43]. A few
months were allowed to prepare the launch of the new pol-
icy in April 2010. Without doubt, the introduction of the
Free Health Care Initiative (FHCI) is the key event that
emerged from the document review and that informants
consistently mentioned in their narratives about the recon-
struction of the health sector.
Different factors emerge as the ‘drivers of change’ for
this reform. Certainly, the health status of the population
with one of the highest maternal mortality rates in the
world, as well as emerging evidence of financial barriers
in access to healthcare, played an important part in pro-
moting the policy ([44] & KII). However, even more crit-
ical seems to be the role of the President and the lead he
took to include the FHCI among the government’s prior-
ities. The political dimension of the FHCI is confirmed by
the President’s direct involvement in the announcement of
it as a ‘Flagship Project’, by the work done by the Strategy
and Policy Unit, a very influential, high-level advisory unit
in charge of promoting the presidential agenda [42], as well
as in numerous interviews. Additionally, the international
environment and the pressure from external actors also
contributed to the decision. Indeed, free healthcare was at
the time an increasingly popular reform in many African
countries, supported by some of the international donors,
and in particular the UK Department for International
Development (DfID), which also made funding available
tied to the implementation of this particular reform. As
one informant stated:
“You have to have it [the FHCI] in context. I know
that there was a push in 2008/2009 by Gordon Brown
and he decided, DfID decided to support [the reform].
And because of DfID support, […] that is why it was
able to get off. Under our government’s own resources
they could not [support it].” (KII – MoHS).
The launch of the FHCI provided an opportunity for
health system strengthening and to address in a more
comprehensive and organic way the issues that previ-
ously were partially solved with piecemeal changes. The
design and preparation of the FHCI (much more than
its implementation) represented an occasion to increase
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broad, common objective to all stakeholders (KII). Six
Technical Working Groups were put in place, of which
one focused on HRH, which held meetings weekly and
were tasked with designing the necessary reforms, as
well as of coordinating among the different partners
[45].
With reference to HRH, the launch of the FHCI played
an instrumental and catalytic role in pushing reforms. It
was explicitly recognized by all stakeholders that ad-
dressing issues affecting the health workforce was critical
for the success of the FHCI, for at least two reasons:
firstly, HWs would have to deal with an increased work-
load; and secondly, in order to compensate facilities and
HWs for the loss in revenues due to the end of the cost-
recovery. With the inputs from the Working Group,
HRH reforms started developing. The result was that, by
April 2010, salaries had been increased for all HWs in
technical positions. The increase was substantial, ranging
from 314% for the lower grades up to 705% for the
higher grades [46]. As a corollary to the salary increase,
an in-depth verification and cleaning of the MoHS pay-
roll was carried out to ensure that only legitimate staff
were included and to eliminate ‘ghost workers’ [47]. Add-
itionally, a mobile recruitment programme at district level
was put in place for the fast-track recruitment of new
workers and of those already volunteering in the facilities
[47]. At the same time, discussions began about the
introduction of a system to monitor the presence of
HWs in the facilities, which was later introduced in
mid-2010 when staff absence begun being monitored
through the Attendance Monitoring System, and January
2011 when the Sanctions Framework was implemented
[48].
Obviously, the decision-making process that led to the
choice, design and implementation of these reforms was
less smooth and linear that it would appear from the end
results. While the creation of inter-agency working groups
undoubtedly increased coordination, some issues were
hidden under the surface. As one respondent recalls,
“Of course we had our Working Group meetings and
we would talk, but these were the ‘big lines’. If you go
to the little activities, we were not so well
coordinated”. (KII – NGO).
In particular, concerns emerged around the role of the
donors, their different views on FHCI and on how differ-
ent components of the health system could be reorga-
nized to provide free health services. In particular, the
argument between two donors around the merits of a
salary increase compared to the introduction of a
performance-based financing (PBF) scheme stalled the
discussion for some time. As a key informant recalls,“These meetings [of the HRH Working Group] were
completely dominated by [two donors] having their
ideological fight effectively. I mean, it wasn’t just
those two individuals but these meetings achieved
very little, because, when these two big donors are
busy having a fight, week after week after week not
much else gets discussed.” (KII – TA).
In the end, while conflicting agendas and ideologies
may have played a role in the decision, the choice of pol-
icy approach (i.e. the salary increase) was ultimately
taken on the basis of practical feasibility. Although it
was recognized that PBF would have had the advantage
of improving the accountability of HWs, it was also
agreed that setting up a PBF scheme would have higher
transaction costs and take longer than a salary increase.
This was perceived as a major disadvantage given the
urgency of the launch of the FHCI (KII – donor). More-
over, after a nation-wide HWs strike which took place in
March 2010 in request for higher salaries, this option
became inevitable. What emerges from the analysis is that
the MoHS perspective seemed to have been caught in the
cross-fire of the donors’ agendas and the funding possibil-
ities that came with donors’ support. It also appears that
the corollary measures taken, such as the payroll cleaning
and the introduction of the Sanctions Framework, were
not only strategies to improve the HRH management and
performance, but also a conditional request from the
donors funding the reform, and DfID in particular, in
order to “protect their investment” and “minimize risk” of
misuse of their funds (KII – donor).
Several episodes confirm the influence of external ac-
tors, as well as the fragmented and ‘serendipitous’ nature
of policy-making at the time. Many respondents recog-
nized the drawbacks of the technical assistance provided,
characterized by high turnover and little coordination,
which resulted in the loss of institutional memory, dupli-
cations and incoherence in policy-making and implemen-
tation. This is, for instance, the case with the cleaning of
the MoHS payroll which was done in 2009–2010, but
had already been carried out a few years before for the
entire civil service ([49] & KII). Providing another ex-
ample, some informants recalled how, despite the pres-
sures and promises of some partners, the issue of funding
the salary increase, was resolved in an “entirely coinci-
dental” way (KII – TA), when the Global Fund’s Health
System Strengthening funds became available. Inter-
estingly, the Global Fund had not participated in the
Working Group’s discussions directly and its low level of
engagement contributed to creating a commonly accepted
narrative around the role of donors, where DfID (contrib-
uting, over three years, about 22% of the total health salar-
ies after the increase, but highly involved in the discussion
and providing substantial, direct support to the MoHS
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central role and was able to steer critical decisions, than
the Global Fund (contributing 20% of the total amount, in
the initial 3 years) [50].
HRH policy-making after the Free Health Care Initiative:
2011–2012
Beyond the urgency of the FHCI launch, the momentum
for the collaboration between MoHS and partners seems
diminished, if not lost, afterwards. The Working Groups
are reported to meet much less regularly after the launch
of the FHCI and were almost inactive by March 2013.
Nevertheless, two major reforms were implemented after
2010, which in fact had been discussed or planned at the
time of the FHCI design: a Performance-based Financing
(PBF) scheme and a Remote Allowance for HWs work-
ing in rural posts.
While the discussion of a PBF scheme became
detached from the design and the planning of the FHCI
as the salary increase option was preferred, meetings for
the planning of PBF continued, especially between the
World Bank and the Department for Planning and Infor-
mation (DPI) of the MoHS. The scheme was designed and
has been implemented since April 2011. Along with the
World Bank, which as the promoter and the funder of the
scheme is recognized to be the driving actor for its imple-
mentation, the DPI also played a critical role and remains
in charge of the operationalization of the policy. In contrast,
the Department for HRH (D-HRH) which is in charge of
the payroll management (which, incidentally, is supported
by a different donor) is far less involved in the scheme and
has surprisingly little overview of the working mechanisms
of PBF. The consequence of this is a further fragmenta-
tion, not only in terms of the design of the HRH policies
and the package of incentive for HWs, but also of the im-
plementation of the PBF scheme. This has been plagued
with severe delays in the payments made to the facilities,
which undermine the effectiveness of the scheme and may
have had negative consequences on the performance of
the HWs (KII).
A similar story applies to the Remote Allowance for
HWs, which was introduced in early 2012. This policy had
already been discussed before the launch of the FHCI;
however, it was not implemented because of the lack of re-
sources. As further funding from the Global Fund became
available, the policy was finally designed and introduced.
Again, the DPI is mainly responsible for its implementa-
tion and, despite some collaboration with the D-HRH to
access payroll data, there appears to be a strict division of
tasks between the two departments, with little transpar-
ency in its management. As a consequence, few actors
seem familiar with the mechanisms for eligibility and
funding. Furthermore, the Remote Allowance currently
rarely reaches the HWs that are eligible for it, due to thediscontinuity of the Global Fund funding, as well as the
poor communication and coordination within the MoHS
(KII). The separate management of the Remote Allowance
creates a further fragmentation of policies and activities,
even within the MoHS.
Beyond these two major reforms (and their implementa-
tion challenges), several HRH issues remain unsolved or
only partially addressed. For instance, during the prepar-
ation for the FHCI, a mobile recruitment programme had
been set up. However, this remained a one-off exercise. For
the routine recruitment of HWs, the establishment of a
Health Service Commission (HSC) was planned to replace
the Human Resources Management Office (HRMO). Des-
pite the HSC being established by a Governmental Act in
2011 and the Commissioners being nominated, the HSC
appears to be still not functional in March 2013. Similarly,
pre-service training has been overlooked in the rush for
the launch of the FHCI, in order to focus on aspects that it
was possible to address faster (e.g., recruitment of HWs
and in-service training). In-service training proliferated
in an uncoordinated manner and only in early 2014 was
the D-HRH of the MoHS preparing an HRH Training Plan
for the next 10 years, to ensure the standardization and
coordination of both pre-service and in-service training.
Additionally, the role of non-financial incentives for the
motivation of HWs, and in particular for those in rural
postings, also emerges as largely ignored by policy-makers.
In terms of official MoHS policies, while the documents
prepared before 2009 have remained mostly on paper, as
described above, those approved following the launch
of the FHCI, and in particular, the Human Resources
For Health Policy and the Human Resource for Health
Strategic Plan 2012–2016 [41,51] seem to have been pre-
pared to give an ex-post, official shape to the changes that
had already taken place at operational level in HRH
strategies.
Discussion
The stages of policy-making in post-conflict Sierra Leone
Figure 1 plots the sequence of Sierra Leone’s main HRH
policy and operational reforms over time. It points out
to three broad stages in the policy-making process.
The initial post-conflict period was certainly critical to
define the trajectory in the reconstruction of the health
system and determine the shape of the system in place.
It was, for example, the decision not taken to contract-out
health services that put the MoHS in charge not only of
the stewardship of the system, but also of service delivery.
The decision appears to be based on contextual factors.
First, the government legitimacy was (more or less) ex-
tended to the entire country and its authority recognized
by all [4]. This means that the MoHS was recognized to
have sufficient capacity to reach all areas, and that public
services could be provided safely without the need of
Figure 1 The sequencing of HRH policies and reforms in Sierra Leone: 2002-2012.
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ence of the UK, because of the historical relations between
the two countries (from the freed slaves’ settlements in Si-
erra Leone to the active role played by the British Army at
the end of the conflict) may have led to a certain pattern
in terms of aid and development. DfID preferences in
terms of health systems organization may have influenced
the decision to opt for direct public provision of
healthcare.
However, in the immediate post-conflict, efforts to tackle
HRH issues were limited to ‘fire-fighting’ measures, as
noted in other post-conflict settings [4,7]. Rarely were these
measures translated into formal, coherent and comprehen-
sive Ministerial policies, as partners adopted a fragmented
approach, often implemented without the involvement of
the MoHS (for example, by providing salary supplementa-
tions or hiring HWs directly). Little or no opportunities
opened for strategic reforms, possibly because of the uncer-
tain political context, which is a common feature of post-
conflict settings [10,22,40].
While these difficulties are generally recognized, some
authors suggest that there is a ‘window of opportunity’
for reform in the immediate post-conflict period due to
the political energy released by the change of regime, the
fluidity of the situation with new players and ideas enter-
ing the political arena, and increased funding available
[5,7,10,40]. Sierra Leone experienced a prolonged transi-
tion at the end of the conflict comparable to that of
Liberia and South Sudan, rather than a ‘sudden onset’ of
peace [3], but, for example in contrast to Liberia, there
was no transitional government. National elections were
held immediately after the peace agreement (in 2002)
and the government retained a certain degree of legitim-
acy, control and capacity to provide services [4]. Despite
these possibly favorable conditions, in those early years,
there was no decision space opening for strategic health
system strengthening reforms (including HRH changes),
under the weak leadership of the government and the
patchy interventions of the development partners. In termsof funding, the National Health Accounts reveal that the
donors’ contribution to the Total Health Expenditure
(THE) was 146.86 billion Leones in 2004. It then decreased
to 109 billion in 2007, but substantially increased to 450.77
billion in 2010. In relative terms, this represented 18% of
the THE in 2004, 12% in 2007 and 25% in 2010 [52,53].
The data confirm that, while donor funds were higher in
2004 than in 2007 both in absolute and relative terms, the
substantial increase in funding followed the establishment
of the FHCI.
Therefore, in the case of HRH policy in Sierra Leone,
the ‘window of opportunity’ seems to have opened later
than usually recognized and for reasons not necessarily
linked to the post-conflict phase, but rather to the mo-
mentum created around the FHCI. Indeed, it took about
eight years after the official end of the conflict for a sec-
ond phase of intensive policy-making to begin, brought
by strategic reforms for the health system. The disappoint-
ingly late onset and slow pace of the reconstruction process
has been noted in other contexts. In South Sudan, it took
three years after the peace agreement before an actual start
to the recovery activities was made [3], while in Liberia the
international community was not able to stimulate prepara-
tory steps for an organic health system strengthening
reform during the initial 3-year transitional phase, so that
another 3 years under the new government had to go by
before it was possible to start addressing the reconstruction
of the health sector [54]. Also, for the case of Sierra Leone,
it was a separate event, i.e. the launch of the FHCI, not
related to the post-conflict setting that made it possible to
overcome the political uncertainty and bring pressure for
change, opening a political ‘window’ for it.
The announcement of the FHCI was the necessary in-
strumental event and catalyst for action in all respects of
the health system, including HRH. This pattern of HRH
reform is not uncommon to other contexts, whether post-
conflict or not. The most salient moment in this trajectory
was the introduction (for reasons mostly external to the
health sector) of a broader health financing reform, not
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pact on the HRH reform process and was instrumental to
it. While Sierra Leone has been one of the few (if not the
only) country to explicitly address the link between the re-
moval of fees and the incentives faced by HWs [46], thus
making the FHCI more effective (at least, in the design),
the fact that a broader health financing reform may be a
helpful or even indispensable entry point for HRH reform
is a key insight common to other contexts ([22] & KII).
Undeniably, following the introduction of the FHCI,
some important progress was made, at least in the de-
sign of HRH policies and likely in their implementation
and impact on the health system (an evaluation of the
effects of the FHCI and related reforms is currently un-
derway). However, below the surface appearance of suc-
cessful reforms, issues remained for the overall planning
and, as noted in other post-conflict settings [22], differ-
ent HRH-related policies were managed separately with
little coordination between donors, as well as within the
MoHS, between the different departments.
After the launch of the FHCI and related reforms, a new
phase in HRH policy-making can be identified. In this
phase, post-conflict issues and features become less appar-
ent. Compared to the previous phase, the pace of HRH
decision-making and reforms slowed down, losing the pre-
vious momentum. The Working Groups almost stopped
meeting altogether and coordination became more diffi-
cult. Additionally, with reduced political pressure for the
policies introduced after the FHCI, implementation of the
policies has not followed the design and there are several
problems and delays in their execution.
Features of the policy-making context
The HRH policy trajectory in Sierra Leone shows the role
played by historical events and contextual factors in con-
straining future choices (the concept of ‘path dependency’).
As noted in other post-conflict countries, uncontrovertibly
“the future health system [is] shaped by the present deci-
sions” ([22]: 665). In the case of Sierra Leone, for example,
the fact that the contracting-out approach, which is often
adopted in post-conflict settings, was not taken, has af-
fected the subsequent trajectory of policy-making in HRH
and beyond. However, despite the fact that some decisions
appear irreversible because of how policies developed in
previous stages, the Sierra Leonean HRH policy trajectory
also shows that it is possible to generate radical reforms
in the health sector. As pointed out in the literature,
political uncertainty and (politically) fragmented health
systems are unlikely to produce “big non-incremental
change”. Nevertheless, the realization of propitious condi-
tions could increase the likelihood of such change taking
place [55]. In the case of Sierra Leone, the emergence
of a powerful initiative, which acted as catalyst both
with respect to the internal political will and theexternal (political and financial) support, was critical to
build momentum, open a political ‘window of opportunity’
and create widespread support for radical reform in all
aspects of the health system, including HRH.
It could be argued that some elements more common
in a post-conflict context facilitated this process. One of
these features is the fluidity of power relations and
dynamics between influential actors that could facilitate
reform. An example of this emerged in our study. While in
other countries the professional boards are a powerful
actor and the relations between those bodies and the MoH
are entrenched in the system, often limiting the space for
reform on HRH issues, in Sierra Leone the power relations
with the professional associations seemed much more
fluid. The Nursing Board, for instance, is chaired by the
Chief Nursing Officer (Director of Nursing) at the MoHS,
and is by definition aligned to the decisions taken by the
MoHS, so that there is less or no opposition to radical
changes. No opposition to the introduction of the Sanction
Framework came from any of the professional boards on
behalf of their affiliates (KII). Secondly, it is possible that
because of the state of the health system, the launch of the
FHCI could not be based on some relatively minor, incre-
mental measure, but it required wider reforms, including
for HRH. It could be hypothesized that in other non post-
conflict contexts, such reforms could be postponed or
diluted over time, while in a reconstruction context, the
gravity of the situation, accompanied by the general cli-
mate of reform, renovation and change could foster new
initiatives and gather national and international support
around them. Indeed, similarly to South Africa in 1994
where the post-crisis situation created both an opportun-
ity and a need for dramatic change [56,57], Sierra Leone
has enjoyed high levels of political interest and pressure.
This was coupled with substantial donor funding and
technical assistance, while in other sub-Saharan Africa
countries free health care initiatives were introduced
without generating such momentum (as for example in
Burundi, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Senegal, Sudan and others
[58-64]). The reasons are likely to be related to the com-
bination between (i) the national political conjuncture
under the new government interested in implementing a
visible and successful flagship reform, (ii) the international
momentum around the improvement of Maternal and
Child Health and the introduction of fee exemptions, as
well as the major role played by some donors, and espe-
cially by a donor such as the UK with close historical ties
to Sierra Leone, and (iii) the health needs of the popula-
tion (in particular, with reference to the high maternal
mortality levels).
Other features of the policy-making environment that
our analysis highlights are less specific to the post-conflict
context. It could be argued that they are not qualitatively
different from those in low-income settings, but that
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sues but worse) or, in fact, negligible. One such feature
relates to the role of external actors in influencing the
policy-making processes, which occurs in non post-conflict
settings and is well documented in post-conflict where gov-
ernments are under-resourced and weak [3,10,40,54,65].
Sierra Leone is no exception and, although evidence and
health needs certainly played a role, the approach adopted
for decision-making seems to be a pragmatic one, where
the critical issue of the availability of funding allowed
space for donor influences. Also, some HRH mea-
sures, such as the reorganization and management of
the payroll, received high levels of donor-funded tech-
nical assistance, which may have allowed their realization,
but raises concerns around their sustainability in the
longer-term. Additionally, despite the noteworthy increase
in the alignment of partners to the ministerial policies
during the preparation of the FHCI, there appear to be
some disconnections between the different actors. The
fragmentation of views and agendas was partially over-
come by the urgency to make decisions at the time of the
launch of the FHCI. However, the lack of coordination be-
came problematic later on, as the political pressure for
rapid reforms was reduced. The result was fragmented
policy-making, a set of policies that are not completely co-
herent and a largely ineffective implementation of some of
those policies [10]. Moreover, reforms remained incom-
plete as the adoption and implementation of other neces-
sary measures (e.g., recruitment and deployment of HWs,
improved pre-service training and development of non-
financial incentives) were not pursued or pursued in a
slow and partial manner.
Finally, the apparent success of Sierra Leone in
addressing HRH issues by taking advantage of a window
of opportunity for reform cannot hide the evident
challenges of having HRH changes pushed forward by a
short-lived political pressure. As a consequence of the
urgency of the reforms, preference was often given to
one-off exercises, such as the mobile recruitment, or
shorter-term solutions (as for example the decision to
overlook pre-service training or the postponement of the
introduction of the remote allowance). Similarly to other
settings [65], much attention was generated around the
design of the policies, while far less was given to their im-
plementation at local level, which remains problematic,
despite some innovative features, such as use of civil soci-
ety monitors at facility leveld.
Conclusions
‘Post-conflict’ is a relatively little studied and poorly under-
stood period of time, which may be extremely influential
for the reconstruction of the health system after a period
of social and political unrest. The trajectory of HRH policy
developments in Sierra Leone provides a useful case studyto examine the pattern of reform and the features of the
post-conflict policy-making environment, as well as to
reflect on the hypotheses about ‘path-dependency’ and
‘windows of opportunity’ in the policy-making processes.
Our analysis identifies different stages in the policy-
making processes and discusses the key drivers that de-
termined the shifts and the progression along the policy
trajectory. In terms of context, it appears that policy-
making was driven by the changing overall political situ-
ation, at first uncertain and later on more clearly defined
as the new government set its priorities and put pressure
for the success of its ‘flagship’ reform. It has also shown
that the sense of need for radical change (and the decision
space for it given by the evolving political dynamics) also
played an important part. In terms of actors, the will of
internal high-level political players, as well as the pressure
of international partners contributed to the emergence of
a catalyst initiative (the FHCI). Looking specifically at the
decisions taken on HRH, the role of the agencies in influ-
encing the reform options adopted emerges more clearly,
given the fluidity of power relations in the health sector,
as well as the relatively weak hierarchical structures
and the fragmentation between departments within
the MoHS. The donors’ availability of funds to sup-
port reform, but also, importantly, their direct partici-
pation in policy-making forums and the provision of
technical assistance in key roles within the MoHS de-
fined the relative capacity of these agencies to influ-
ence policy-making.
Our analysis of ‘path-dependency’ and ‘windows of
opportunities’ allows reflection on the overall processes
and patterns of policy change over time. ‘Path-depend-
ency’ and the influence of the decisions taken (or not
taken) in previous stages of the policy-making process
contributed to define the trajectory and limit the options
available. Nevertheless, the case of Sierra Leone shows
that some events, by creating an alignment of actors and
agendas, can act as catalyst for substantial (not incre-
mental) change. Indeed, the pattern of HRH policy in
Sierra Leone allows us to reflect on the timing of
such political ‘window of opportunity’ for reform
along the recovery process. As noted for other post-
conflict countries, despite the potential opportunities
for needed reforms to be introduced with less resist-
ance post-conflict, “long-suffering health systems are
poor reformers” ([51]: 662). From our analysis, it
emerged that the decision space for the reform of the
health system did not open in the immediate post-
conflict period, which was instead characterized by in-
cremental policy-making and stop-gap measures. A
window of opportunity opened later on (8 years after
the end of the war), making it difficult to link it directly
to the features of the immediate post-conflict policy-
making environment.
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aFor an assessment of the outcomes of the HRH policy
making, and an analysis of the evolving incentive envir-
onment in the post-conflict period and how it affected
the recruitment, retention and performance of HWs, see
further work carried out by the ReBUILD Consortium
(www.rebuildconsortium.com/publications/index.htm).
bQuotes from the stakeholder meeting are marked SM,
while those from key informant interviews are marked
KII. In both cases, the type of organization to which the
respondent belongs to is also detailed (i.e., MoHS, donor,
NGO, or TA), unless the same issue was mentioned by
more than one respondent.
cFurther work making use of these data is ongoing and
will be available on the ReBUILD Consortium website
(www.rebuildconsortium.com).
dA civil society organization, the Health for All Coalition
(HAC), was entrusted in 2011 with the function of
guaranteeing an independent oversight on the imple-
mentation of the FHCI and in particular to monitor the
possible under-the-table payments of patients and HWs’
attendance.
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